Notes
i..Norman
Geisler, "The Collapse of Modem Atheism11 in Intellectuals
Speak Out About God, edited by Roy Abraham Varghese, (Chicago:
Regnery Gateway, 1984) p.147
ii. In the Christian hypothesis the commonality
of most moral principles is explained by the moral law having
been written on our hearts or infused into our psyche by God (Romans
2:15). The few differences between cultures is explained by the
human tendency to be independent of God and His laws, and to subsequently
rationalize and justify our independent moral choices. God revealed
further moral details and applications in the Scriptures.
iii. C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion
- Thinking About Faith. (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1985)
pp.70-71.
iv. This illustration was presented by Professor
Peter Horban in a philosophy class at Simon Fraser University,
in fall of 1993, and related to me by a colleague who was present,
Brad Warner.
v.
Cicero cited in George Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age. (Copp
Clark, 1966) pp.35-36.
vi. Richard Taylor, Ethics, Faith and Reason
(Prentice Hall, 1985), pp.90, 84.
vii. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Wittgenstein's
Lectures on Ethics," Philosophical Review, 1965, 74:7
viii. J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1982), p.115.
ix.Cited by W.L. Craig in an audio tape of a
debate between Dr. W.L. Craig and Dr. Henry Morgentaler at the
University of Toronto, January 21, 1993 entitled “The Foundation
of Morality: Natural or Supernatural?”
x.Cited by Craig in Craig/Morgentaler debate
xi. Cited by Craig in Craig/Morgentaler debate
xii. Cited by Craig in Craig/Morgentaler debate
xiii. Some will include the principle of utility
at this point. But notice that the "the greatest good for
the greatest number" is assuming that it is the "good
for humans and for the greatest number of humans", but why
humans? What makes them objectively valuable?
xiv. Coherence is not a sufficient condition
for objective truth. It is possible to be consistent, yet false.
An internally consistent system of ethics would not necessarily
be objective, obligatory, and morally binding on those who disagree.
The Nazi ethic was internally consistent; it needed a vantage
point from outside to judge it.
xv. The one exception that I can see as logically
possible is the Platonic system where the Good exists as an abstract
principle as part of the metaphysical furniture of the universe.
I know of very few modern moral philosophers though who hold this
position. This also means that the moral argument for God's existence
that follows from this article is not deductively certain. The
premise "If God does not exist, then objective moral obligations
do not exist", cannot be certain because of the logical possibility
of moral obligations being Platonic forms. Just because it is
a logical possibility, though, does not mean it is plausible,
or probable, or more probable than the alternatives. The argument,
therefore, must be an argument to the best explanation, where
the theism of a Judeo-Christian type is shown to be a better explanation
than Plato's forms.
xvi. It does no good to enhance the concept
by calling it enlightened self-interest, since this means little
more than being cleverly self-centered.
xvii. D. Stephen Long, in a review in Theology
Today, VOL. XLIX. NO.4, January 1993, p. 553,11. The Shape of
the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundation of Ethics by
C. Stephen Layman.
xviii. R.Z. Friedman, "Does the 'Death
of God' Really Matter? - A Critique of Kai Nielsen's Humanistic
Ethics," International Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, 23:321-332.
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